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Abstract: This paper examines the existence of financial statement 
manipulation in the U.S. during a time period when many of the cur-
rent motivations did not exist. The study looks for types of manipula-
tions that would be motivated by the pre-SEC operating environment. 
To examine this issue, a sample of U.S. firms from the 1915 Moody’s 
Analyses of Investments is divided into industrial firms, railroads, and 
utilities. The railroad and utility companies faced rate regulation dur-
ing this time period, providing incentives to manipulate the financial 
reports so as to maximize the rate received. Industrial firms were not 
regulated. These companies wanted to attract investors, motivating 
manipulations to increase income and net assets. To determine if 
manipulations are occurring, a Benford’s Law analysis is used. This 
analysis examines the frequency of numbers in certain  positions 
within an amount to determine if the distribution of the numbers is 
similar to the pattern documented by Benford’s Law. Some manipula-
tions consistent with expectations are found.
Companies face incentives to choose accounting policies 
and estimates to achieve certain goals.  Managers may want to 
smooth earnings, maximize earnings, or meet analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  They may want to generate enough earnings to be 
able to issue dividends or to maintain their current or debt ra-
tios to satisfy lending agreements. Earnings management is the 
process of choosing accounting alternatives to achieve desired 
accounting results. McKee [2005] stresses that earnings man-
agement uses legal methods as opposed to fraud. Managers may 
also engage in economic earnings management by making oper-
ating decisions designed to achieve desired accounting results.
Several authors have examined accounting policy choice to 
study earnings management.  Many studies have focused on the 
choice of inventory cost-flow assumption [Morse and Richard-
son, 1983; Hunt, 1985; Johnson and Dhaliwal, 1988; Lindahl, 
1989]. In general, these studies have found that companies 
choose the LIFO inventory cost-flow assumption if they face 
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high inflation in the cost of inputs, and also if they have certain 
accounting characteristics such as a high current ratio, low debt 
ratio, and/or large amounts of unrestricted retained earnings. 
These characteristics allow firms to continue with contracts that 
rely on accounting measures while using LIFO to reduce taxable 
income.
Other studies have modeled the accrual process and used 
the results to estimate abnormal accruals.  These studies have 
then used abnormal accruals to examine a number of issues 
related to earnings management [Rees et al., 1996; Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006; 
Pincus et al., 2007]
Another approach to examine earnings management is Ben-
ford’s Law.  Digits are not uniformly distributed in naturally oc-
curring, unrestricted data. Instead, the first digit is much more 
likely to be small and much less likely to be large. For example, 
approximately 30% of the first digits will be one. This is thought 
to be due to the geometric growth of natural processes [Nigrini, 
1999]. Manipulated data do not tend to follow Benford’s Law. 
This occurs because people may overuse a favorite number, for 
example, or may tend to overuse large digits or the digit one 
in an attempt to overstate results. Benford’s Law can then be 
used to detect fraud (Nigrini and Mittermaier, 1997; Carr, 2005; 
Cleary and Thibodeau, 2005;  Johnson, 2005] or earnings man-
agement [Skousen et al., 2004; Guan et al., 2006, 2008; Jordan 
and Clark, 2011].  
This study will examine the earnings management of U.S. 
company-reported data from the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of In-
vestments (Moody’s) using a Benford’s Law analysis.  This time 
period is being chosen because it is before the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was created so that U.S. govern-
ment regulation of securities did not exist. This time period is 
also before the existence of promulgated U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) and modern auditing techniques. 
The study will examine what types of manipulation occurred 
in this environment and whether the manipulations are con-
sistent with basic incentives to maximize the value of the firm. 
The analysis used is empirical which will extend the existing 
historical literature that is primarily based on conjecture and 
conventional wisdom. The sample of firms will be broken into 
industrial companies, which faced no U.S. federal governmental 
regulation, and railroads and utilities, which did have govern-
ment-imposed rate regulations. By looking at these two groups 
of firms, the role of non-securities regulation can be examined 
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as a deterrent to financial statement manipulation.  
Examining these issues will help the profession better 
understand the important role that securities’ regulation does 
play in providing higher quality financial statements. It will also 
provide insight regarding the role of other forms of oversight 
of accounting practice and disclosures in improving reporting. 
Rate regulators in the railroad and utility industries are shown 
to provide some effective controls over certain types of financial 
statement manipulation, while the regulatory process seems to 
encourage other types of manipulations. Specifically, unregulat-
ed industrial companies primarily managed gross revenue, total 
net income, and payables. Regulated companies also managed 
payables. In addition, the regulated companies managed other 
income in the income statement and property, plant, and equip-
ment, equity, and bonds payable in the balance sheet. These 
differential results between the groups studied indicate that pre-
SEC regulatory actions did influence accounting choices.  
The general conclusion that rate regulation did deter ma-
nipulation of operating revenues and operating income also has 
current ramifications. There are movements within the profes-
sion to increase oversight of reporting. The results presented 
here indicate that increased scrutiny of financial statements 
will lead to less manipulation in those areas under scrutiny, 
but can also encourage manipulation in areas not under scru-
tiny. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the 
importance of both securities-based and non-securities-based 
regulation on financial reporting and management incentives to 
manipulate those reports to achieve reporting goals or personal 
gain.
The next sections provide a discussion of the background 
for the study, a review of the literature, and development of 
hypotheses. These sections are followed by a discussion of the 
methodology.  The results of the Benford’s Law tests are then 
presented. The last section presents a discussion and conclusion.
BACKGROUND
Prior to the establishment of the SEC, financial reporting 
was not federally regulated in the U.S. While U.S. stock ex-
changes typically required financial statements for listed com-
panies, GAAP were not well developed, and unlisted firms could 
trade on the exchanges as long as they provided a balance sheet 
[Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993]. The first published attempt at 
U.S. accounting standardization was “Uniform Accounts.” is-
sued April 1, 1917, in the Federal Reserve Bulletin [Tucker, 1987]. 
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Full financial statement audits were not required for New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed companies until 1933 [Skinner, 
1987]. Listing requirements, however, only applied to newly 
listed companies.  As a result, 85% of listed companies had a 
full audit in 1933 [Gross, 2002]. The NYSE did have a listing 
requirement of a balance-sheet audit starting in 1910 [Sivaku-
mar and Waymire, 1993]. Prior to 1917, the lack of promulgated 
accounting standards and minimal audit requirements created 
a situation that allowed firms to choose accounting policies to 
achieve desired results with fewer limitations than firms face 
today.
This study will use this time period, then, to examine 
whether managers took advantage of the lack of regulation and 
standardization to manipulate the reported financial informa-
tion. To complete this investigation, the types of manipulations 
to look for need to be considered. This consideration needs to 
take into account the time period under study as the current 
types of manipulations seen in recent studies may not have been 
common in 1915 because, for instance, managers may not have 
had incentive contracts. Therefore, literature will be examined 
that is of both an historical nature and more current to consider 
what types of accounts may have been manipulated and the ra-
tionale for that manipulation.
The literature that is of an historical nature is used to give 
perspective on the way financial information was prepared and 
used. This provides insights on what types of accounts would 
most likely be manipulated. In reviewing the literature, the 
majority of papers with much depth regarding the preparation 
and use of financial information in the early 1900s are focused 
on the U.K. The literature on U.S. firms from this time period is 
both less substantial and less detailed.  Therefore, the literature 
discussed in the next section will be for both U.S. and U.K.-
based studies. While companies in these two countries did oper-
ate in different economic and regulatory environments, there 
were many similarities as well. Consideration of both reporting 
environments can provide indicators of the types of accounts 
that managers of the day may have manipulated.
LITERATURE
Accounting and Reporting in the U.K.: Laws in the U.K. estab-
lished reporting and auditing requirements prior to the time 
period of this study. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 
required audited balance sheets [Morris, 1993]. This was the 
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earliest legislation requiring financial disclosure. Edwards 
[1992] notes that balance-sheet audits were mandatory by 
1900. Legislation also standardized the reporting formats for 
railroads in 1868, gas utilities in 1871, and electric utilities in 
1882. Therefore, there was considerably more observation and 
standardization of U.K. company reporting than U.S. reports 
at the same time. This increased audit oversight and reporting 
requirements may have led to less manipulation. Arnold [1998] 
does indicate that legislation prior to 1948 was inadequate for 
providing satisfactory disclosures and a reporting environment 
useful for those making capital-investment decisions. Thus, 
the reporting environment in the early 1900s, while more regu-
lated than the U.S. at the same time, still leant itself to potential 
manipulation and reporting norms that would be more closely 
scrutinized under today’s standards. The issues of interest in 
this literature are examples of how accounting and reporting 
were used to manage earnings and to provide insights into the 
types of accounts or statements where manipulation would most 
likely be found. These studies are non-empirical in nature, but 
they do provide useful insights regarding the belief of informed 
historians regarding where and why manipulations of financial 
reporting occurred.   
Secret reserves were common in the U.K. These reserves 
were used to overstate financial position and to smooth earn-
ings [Edwards, 1976; Arnold, 1991]. Companies often created 
reserves by overstating liabilities or depreciation during years of 
high income and then liquidating the reserves during lean years 
[Arnold, 1991].     
Arnold [1998] examined internal information versus pub-
lished statements for 30 U.K. companies between 1900 and 
1924. His results indicate that prior to 1914, little manipulation 
of the statements occurred. From 1915-1924, his analysis docu-
mented manipulations of reported versus internal numbers. 
This manipulation was achieved through depreciation, taxation, 
and secret reserves, used by 25% of the companies after 1915.  
As a result of the lack of audits and promulgated account-
ing standards, manipulation and omission were common in 
public financial statements in the U.K. Maltby [1998] noted that 
concerns over fraud and measurement uncertainty led to the 
Joint Stock Company legislation in Britain in the late 1800s. 
Lee [1975] indicated that the act of 1856 limited dividends paid 
to shareholders to reported earnings. This legislation also re-
quired annual balance sheets and statements of income. Bryer 
[1993] described the more widely owned corporations result-
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ing from the merger wave at the turn of the 20th century in 
Britain as manager-controlled firms. In these entities, investors 
were seen as no more than loose constraints on management 
action. The accounting model that was developed at the time 
was easy for management to manipulate. Lee [1975] indicated 
that it was managers’ opinion that shareholders only needed to 
know income so that they would be aware of the dividend to 
expect. Thus, income was manipulated through the use of secret 
reserves to allow for more conservative dividend payments to 
owners. Jones and Aiken [1994] also support the assertion that 
most of the income manipulation was used to stabilize dividend 
policy. The problem for investors in the early 20th century in the 
U.K. was not lack of disclosure as much as manipulation of and 
omissions in the statements provided. Without any reporting 
standards or regulations, what and how much to report was at 
the discretion of the Board of Directors.
Accounting and Reporting in the U.S.: Manipulation by Ameri-
can companies prior to the establishment of the SEC has been 
more infrequently studied than in the U.K. Merino and Neimark 
[1982] claimed, however, that financial statements were of poor 
quality and unreliable.  Hawkins [1963] noted that during the 
1920s, the Investment Bankers Association of America sought 
greater standardization of accounting information provided by 
industrial issuers.  Statements were difficult to use for analysis 
because of a lack of standardization.
Johnson [1943] examined reporting of U.S. companies and 
found large charges and credits being made directly to surplus 
or reserves that should have been included in income, using a 
modern view of an all-inclusive income statement. Some charg-
es were so large that they exceeded the reported income of the 
entity. Without standards to guide practice, what amounts went 
through reported income and what types of charges and credits 
went directly to surplus was at the discretion of management 
and the Board of Directors. For instance, Kern [2000] provided 
evidence that depreciation varied between good and poor years 
for companies between 1908 and 1930. This was an area of re-
porting that could easily be manipulated in an attempt to make 
the company look like a better investment prospect. Johnson 
[1943] noted that operating results generally did go through 
income, but nonoperating activity was inconsistently allocated 
between income and surplus.  
Merino (1993) discussed the use of reserves to limit distrib-
utable income since it was common to pay all income as divi-
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dends prior to 1920. These reserves were then used to regulate 
the amount of dividend payments and resulted in reported in-
come manipulation to achieve the desired dividend distribution 
to shareholders. Thus, the condition of reporting in the U.S. was 
similar to that described by Bryer [1993] in Britain. Managers 
and the Board of Directors were free to adjust discretionary 
amounts such as depreciation, depletion, and reserves to report 
the income they wanted to report.
Rate Regulation in the U.S.: Public concern over rates in the 
late 1800s led to the regulation of railroads and utilities. The 
first laws were the Granger Laws established in the Midwestern 
states in the 1870s. These laws gave states the ability to regulate 
railroad rates [Ulen, 1980].  
Rate regulation was typically based on cost plus a fair 
return on investment [Covaleski, et al., 1995]. This provided 
regulated companies, such as railroads and utilities, an incen-
tive to over-invest in assets in order to maximize the rate and, 
therefore, revenue. Boockholdt [1978] noted that the use of 
these return-on-invested-capital (ROIC) rate-setting regula-
tions coincides in time with the increased use of the retirement 
method of depreciation and a trend toward capitalizing rather 
than expensing new assets. While he did not empirically test this 
relationship, the correlation between a regulatory change and 
a change in accounting policies seems to have clearly existed. 
These changes in accounting policies were such that it would 
tend to increase rates.  These may not have been the only types 
of accounting changes made in response to rate regulation. This 
study seeks to determine if other efforts may also have been 
used by these regulated companies to manipulate the rate base.
Alternatively, the regulation process may have provided 
some scrutiny of the accounting process, reducing the ability of 
the managers to manipulate assets [Baskin, 1988; McKee, 2005]. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was established 
in 1887.  The ICC devised an accounting system that served 
as a basis for examining revenues, expenses, and earnings of 
railroads and utilities so that fair rates could be established 
[Trebing, 1984]. These examinations may have acted to limit 
regulated companies’ abilities to manipulate income. An ex-
ample of such a limit would relate to property, plant, and equip-
ment. If physical comparisons were made to accounting records, 
companies could no longer capitalize assets that were complete-
ly utilized in the current period since they would not be physi-
cally present to examine. Adequacy of depreciation would be an-
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other possible item for regulators to examine through these laws 
that could have been highly manipulated without the regulatory 
oversight. As a result of these regulatory movements, account-
ing-rate-of-return-based laws existed in 29 states and the federal 
government by 1913 [Trebing, 1984]. The Hepburn Act (1906) 
empowered the ICC to establish a uniform chart of accounts for 
railroads [Ulen, 1980]. This uniformity in reporting would fur-
ther reduce management’s ability to manipulate earnings. Siva-
kumar and Waymire [2003] provide some empirical support for 
this lack of manipulation, reporting that railroads responded to 
accounting rules for fixed assets by adopting more conservative 
accounting policies to reduce earnings and, thereby, preventing 
lower rates rather than engaging in income-smoothing activities 
by adjusting maintenance expenses to counteract high or low 
revenue periods. 
HYPOTHESES
The literature examined in the previous section seems to 
indicate that companies had the ability and incentive to ma-
nipulate income during the early 1900s. Incentives to manage 
earnings during that time period differ from incentives today. 
For example, fewer analysts followed firms in the early 20th cen-
tury, so the need to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts may have 
either not existed or been much less significant. However, since 
individual investors still had expectations, incentives existed 
to maximize or smooth earnings. The literature also indicates 
that incentives existed to manage earnings to satisfy dividend 
requirements or to remain attractive to lenders [Lee, 1975; Meri-
no, 1993]. To help individual investors make decisions, Moody’s 
issued stock and bond ratings. These ratings, in turn, were 
influenced by financial results. Thus, attracting investors would 
have been easier with higher net assets and income. The litera-
ture indicated that reserves were commonly used to accomplish 
this goal [Johnson, 1943; Edwards, 1976; Arnold, 1991; Merino, 
1993]. This implies that the basic motive to improve the appear-
ance of the company through “window dressing” existed in the 
pre-SEC environment as it does today.  
Incentives to reduce income also existed.  In 1909, the gov-
ernment passed an excise tax on corporate income of 1% of in-
come in excess of $5,000 [Previts and Bricker, 1994]. Thus, there 
were competing pressures on income manipulation to achieve 
different goals.
Audits were less frequent and less developed than today. 
Balance-sheet-only audits were a common practice, becoming 
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popular around 1910 [Gilman, 1939; Corcell, 1989]. Baskin 
[1988] noted that the lax standards of the day relegated account-
ing earnings to be a validation of dividend policy.  The reporting 
environment was such that not all firms issued financial state-
ments, and the statements issued varied greatly in the level of 
quality and quantity of detail provided [Brief, 1987]. A lack of 
standardized GAAP and less detailed audits created a situation 
where managers were able to make a greater number of ac-
counting choices than today.
H1: Unregulated companies managed earnings and net as-
sets to appear to be a more favorable investment.
However, as a result of rate regulation, railroads and utili-
ties may have been less able to manipulate operating costs and 
earnings than unregulated companies. The regulated companies 
had an incentive not to appear too profitable in order to avoid 
rate reduction and/or increased regulation. Thus, the incen-
tive in income manipulation may have been to reduce income 
through higher non-operating costs and deferring other income 
rather than increasing income as would be the case for most 
unregulated companies. Likewise, the increasing of reserves to 
hide excessive profit may also have been used. The regulated 
companies were receiving enough scrutiny; they did not want to 
attract more through the appearance of high profit margins.
Regulated companies had an incentive to manage assets to 
charge higher rates, but the regulatory environment left them 
unable to manipulate operating revenues.  In this sense, regula-
tors may have been providing an audit function with respect to 
some of the reported information of these regulated entities in 
the absence of actual financial statement audits.
H2: Rate-regulated companies managed net assets to in-
crease the numbers to provide higher rates and only 
nonoperating components of earnings through income 
decreasing manipulations.
METHODOLOGY
This study examines earnings management among firms 
listed in the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of Investments. This publica-
tion included data for 5,334 companies. A random sample of 
810 companies was taken. Companies were eliminated if they 
were wholly owned subsidiaries (331), were incorporated out-
side the U.S. (10), were in receivership (1), or had no financial 
statements (141). This left a sample of 129 industrial companies 
(123 of which published an income statement and 128 of which 
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published a balance sheet), 89 railroads (82 of which published 
an income statement and 72 of which published a balance 
sheet), and 109 utilities (105 of which published an income 
statement and 92 of which published a balance sheet).   
Earnings management may be operationalized in a variety 
of ways. Specific accounting policies are not disclosed in the 
1915 Moody’s. The average number of line items disclosed in 
the income statement was 4.33. With this lack of detail in the 
financial statements, estimating accruals would be too difficult. 
Therefore, earnings management is measured by whether the 
distribution of first digits in numbers conforms to Benford’s 
Law.
Digits are not uniformly distributed in naturally occurring, 
unrestricted data. Instead, the first digit is much more likely 
to be small and correspondingly less likely to be large. This is 
thought to be due to the geometric growth of natural processes.
Benford postulated that first digits in naturally distributed 
data are distributed with probability equal to log(1+1/d), where 
d represents the digit and log is the base 10 logarithm [Nigrini 
and Mittermaier, 1997]. The following chart provides the prob-
ability that the first digit of any number has the value given:
  Digit  Probability 
     1     0.30103   
     2     0.17609   
     3     0.12494   
     4     0.09691    
     5     0.07918
     6     0.06695
     7      0.05799
     8     0.05115
     9     0.04576
Manipulated data do not tend to follow Benford’s Law. This 
occurs because people may overuse a favorite number, for ex-
ample, or may tend to overuse large digits or the digit one in an 
attempt to overstate results. Benford’s Law can be used to detect 
fraud [Nigrini and Mittermaier, 1977; Cleary and Thibadeau, 
2005; Carr, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Kelly, 2011] or earnings man-
agement.
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Guan, et al. [2006] used Benford’s Law to find that U.S. 
firms engage in cosmetic earnings management to achieve key 
reference points in each of the reported four quarters. The 
fourth quarter, which is audited, has less manipulation. Jordan 
and Clark [2011] reported that cosmetic earnings management 
decreased after passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Skousen et al. [2004] 
and Guan et al. [2008] reported similar cosmetic rounding of 
reported earnings among Japanese and Taiwanese firms, respec-
tively.
Lin et al. [2011] used Benford’s Law to show that Taiwanese 
firms tend to report earnings in increments of 5 or 10. Zhou 
[2010] reported that using I/B/E/S, analyst forecasts that are in 
increments of 5 tend to be more optimistic and be accompanied 
by weaker stock-market responses.  
Benford’s Law analysis only utilizes information from one 
account unlike accounting policy choice or abnormal accrual 
estimation techniques which utilize information from other 
accounting choices or reported amounts. This focus on one 
account results in Benford’s Law studies having less statistical 
power to detect earnings management. Only manipulations of 
one account significant enough and frequent enough to alter the 
distribution of digits can be detected. The other techniques can 
combine the changes in various accounts to detect manipulation 
rather than rely on adjustment to one account alone. However, 
Benford’s Law can be tested on any set of data without the need 
to gather other information that may be difficult or impossible 
to identify, especially during the early 20th century when ac-
counting was not as fully developed as it is today and when dis-
closure was less complete.
The actual distribution of first digits will be compared to 
the expected distribution with the goodness-of-fit test. The chi-
square statistic was computed for the overall distribution. A sec-
ond statistic was computed to measure firms’ potential desire to 
manage size. Firms wanting to make an amount appear larger 
want to manage first digits up to the next 1 or 5. Firms wanting 
to make an amount to appear smaller would want to manage 
the first digit down to the previous 9 or 4 [Carslaw, 1988; Skou-
sen et al.; Guan and Wetzel, 2004]. The second chi-square sta-
tistic compared the distribution of three sets of first digits: 1 or 
5 (for line-item amount increases), 4 or 9 (for line item-amount 
decreases), and all other digits. In addition, the t-statistic was 
used to test the distribution of the digits 1, 4, 5, and 9 relative to 
Benford’s Law.  
Each line item in the reported financial statements was 
11
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gathered. Because of the lack of standards during this time pe-
riod, there was considerable variation in the account titles given 
in Moody’s. The authors combined only obviously similar items 
(such as cost of goods sold and cost of sales).  If there was any 
doubt that a title represented something different than the titles 
already in use, the line item was added to the data base as a 
separately titled account. As a result, the data base used had 107 
balance-sheet account titles and 48 income-statement account 
titles. The goodness-of-fit tests were conducted for each account 
title that had 20 or more observations in the sample. By examin-
ing items as reported, the Benford’s Law test is being used ap-
propriately by examining naturally occurring numbers. If line 
items were arbitrarily combined, the numbers being reported 
would no longer be naturally occurring numbers, and therefore, 
Benford’s Law would not apply. The tests were separately con-
ducted for unregulated industrial companies and rate-regulated 
companies. 
RESULTS
Unregulated Companies: Table 1 presents the results of the 
goodness-of-fit test for the income statements of unregulated 
industrial companies. These companies were tested for gross 
revenue, gross earnings, operating expenses, depreciation, pre-
ferred dividends, dividends paid, fixed charges, total net income, 
balance, and final surplus. The overall goodness-of-fit test for 
total net income was significant with a probability 0.079. Gross 
revenue had a first digit of 1 or 5 more frequently than expected, 
though the frequency of the digit 5 did not achieve significance 
when considered individually. This result indicates that in-
dustrial companies had a tendency to report revenue in larger 
amounts than Benford’s Law would expect. Interestingly, 17 of 
the 32 companies reporting net income had a first digit of 1, 
while none of the companies reported a first digit of 5. The chi-
square test for the combined first digits is not significant.  Still, 
the evidence suggests a tendency to report total net income that 
appears larger, moving into the next digit with a leading one. 
12
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TABLE 1
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Unregulated Industrial Companies Income Statements
Distribu-
tion of 1st 
digit t-statistic
Distribution 
of 1 & 5, 4 & 
9, and others
Statement Line 
Item N
Chi-square
Probability 1 5 4 9
Chi-square
Probability
Gross Revenue 46 0.271 1.82** 1.01 -0.48 0.035**
Gross Earnings 24 0.352 0.57 -0.30 0.12 0.833
Operating 
Expenses
32 0.404 0.72 -0.02 -0.96 -0.82 0.196
Depreciation 35 0.305 -0.72 -0.80 0.63 -0.89 0.968
Preferred
Dividends
23 0.422 -0.19 -1.02 0.423
Dividends Paid 49 0.191 -0.08 -1.09 -1.19 0.085*
Fixed Charges 26 0.832 0.32 -0.65 0.872
Total Net 
Income
32 0.079* 2.65*** -1.33* -0.36 0.88 0.151
Balance 50 0.616 0.14 -1.12 0.14 0.689
Final Surplus 82 0.634 -0.53 0.58 -0.13 0.756
*  10% Significance **  5% Significance ***  1% Significance
T-statistics are adjusted for the finite correction factor.  Raw statistics less than
0.50 are omitted from the table.
The only other line item disclosed in the income state-
ment to have a significant deviation from Benford’s Law was 
dividends paid. The digits 4 and 9 were less likely than expected 
even though neither digit achieved significance individually. 
Reporting these digits less frequently than expected indicates a 
tendency to pay larger dividends than would be expected from a 
normal distribution of first digits even though the frequency of 
the digits 1 and 5 do not statistically indicate the tendency for 
larger dividend payments. This finding of inflated dividend pay-
ments is consistent with Lee [1975] who noted that the dividend 
policy of companies during this time period was to maximize 
the dividend paid to shareholders. 
Table 2 presents the results of the goodness-of-fit tests for 
the balance sheets of unregulated industrial companies.  The 
balance-sheet items tested were property, plant, and equipment; 
investments; inventories; bills receivable; accounts receivable; 
cash; common stock; preferred stock; bonded debt; bills pay-
able; accounts payable; reserve; surplus; and total assets. 
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TABLE 2
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Unregulated Industrial Company Balance Sheets
Distribu-
tion of 1st 
digit t-statistic
Distribu-
tion of 1 
& 5, 4 & 9, 
and others
Statement 
Line Item N
Chi-square
Probability 1 5 4 9
Chi-square
Probability
Property, 
Plant, and 
Equipment
79 0.904 -0.80 0.70 -0.60 0.644
Investments 28 0.736 -0.38 0.20 0.764
Inventories 38 0.717 0.35 -0.31 1.54* 0.190
Bills
Receivable
30 0.567 0.58 0.08 -0.25 0.11 0.612
Accounts
Receivable
64 0.423 -1.84** 0.25 0.54 -0.85 0.342
Cash 93 0.423 -0.79 1.20 1.57* 0.62 0.114
Common 
Stock
100 0.105 -2.31** 2.44*** 0.61 -0.51 0.708
Preferred 
Stock
48 0.017** -0.30 0.41 -1.17 0.826
Bonded Debt 39 0.426 -1.13 0.93 0.340
Bills Payable 30 0.634 -1.41* 0.76 -0.25 0.11 0.597
Accounts 
Payable
58 0.057* -1.42* -0.53 2.17** 1.79** 0.003***
Reserves 34 0.561 0.47 1.15 -1.04 -0.05 0.218
Surplus 90 0.406 -0.14 -1.03 -0.82 0.441
Total Assets 104 0.010** -0.17 -0.99 -0.19 0.82 0.656
*  10% Significance  **  5% Significance  ***  1% Significance
T-statistics are adjusted for the finite correction factor.  Raw statistics less than 
0.50 are omitted from the table.
Unregulated industrial companies had a tendency to under-
state accounts payable.  This is indicated by the significance of 
both the first digit distribution as a whole and the distribution 
of 1, 4 and 9, and other numbers relative to 1 and 5 and 4 and 9. 
The direction of the distribution is determined by the t-statistics 
of each number. These t-statistics show that the digits 4 and 9 
were both significantly more common, and the number 1 was 
less common than expected by Benford’s Law. One was also less 
common for bills payable. However, the other results from ac-
counts payable were not replicated for bills payable.
Some evidence of earnings management behavior is demon-
strated among current-asset accounts.  Both the inventory and cash 
accounts show the number 4 being the first digit more often than 
expected. For accounts receivable, 1 is a first digit less often than 
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expected.  Surprisingly, in each case, the company manipulated the 
reported balance to make the account appear smaller than a distri-
bution of numbers consistent with Benford’s Law would look. 
The equity accounts also had deviations from the distri-
bution of first digit numbers that would be expected under 
Benford’s Law.  In the common-stock account, 1 is less com-
mon and 5 is more common than expected.  These results are 
opposite each other since the frequency of both 1 and 5 indicate 
an increasing manipulation effect [Carslaw,1988; Skousen et al., 
2004]. Both the chi-square statistic for the first digit as a whole 
and for the groupings of 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other numbers 
are insignificant for common stock. Thus, the intent of the ma-
nipulation with common stock is unclear.
The overall distribution of first digits is significantly differ-
ent from expected for the preferred-stock account. However, 
the other reported statistics do not show a significant deviation 
from the expected distribution. The only digits that showed sig-
nificance were 2 (t-statistic of 3.42) and 6 (t-statistic of 1.57).  
Total assets also show a similar result.  The overall distribu-
tion of first digits significantly differs from Benford’s Law as 
shown by the significance of the overall chi-square result.  How-
ever, the only other significant differences from the expected 
distribution were for 2 (t-statistic of 2.01), 6 (t-statistic of 2.17), 
and 8 (t-statistic of 2.75). These numbers were all more common 
than expected and do not represent increasing or decreasing 
tendencies. A total would also be difficult to manipulate since it 
is the sum of previous numbers. Therefore, the significant result 
found here is probably not related to manipulation.  
Regulated Companies: Table 3 presents the results of the 
goodness-of-fit tests for the income statement of regulated 
companies. The income statement line items tested for these 
companies were gross revenue, operating expenses, tax accrued, 
depreciation, other income, preferred dividends, dividends paid, 
fixed charges, total net income, balance, and final surplus. The 
lack of significance in the overall goodness-of-fit test for net 
income indicates that the distribution of first digits is consistent 
with Benford’s Law. This suggests that the regulatory process 
provided enough scrutiny over reporting to discourage earnings 
management of net income. Significant deviations were found, 
however, in components of the income statement. The first digit 
of tax accrued was less likely to be 1 and more likely to be 9 
than expected.  This result indicates a tendency to understate 
this expense even though neither the chi-square statistic for the 
distribution of first digits as a whole nor the chi-square tests 
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considering 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other numbers were signifi-
cant. This manipulation of taxes is consistent with the findings 
of Arnold [1998], who reported that taxation was one of three 
reported numbers that differed from internal data in his analysis 
of U.K. companies during a similar time period.
TABLE 3
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Regulated Company Income Statements
Distribu-
tion of 1st 
digit t-statistic
Distribution 
of 1 & 5, 
4 & 9, and 
others
Statement
Line Item N
Chi-square
Probability 1 5 4 9
Chi-square
Probability
Gross
Revenues 158 0.671 -0.70 -0.59 -0.66 0.309
Operating 
Expenses 165 0.747 0.82 -0.16 0.92 -0.39 0.571
Tax Accrued 36 0.438 -1.58* 0.40 1.48* 0.394
Depreciation 29 0.747 0.83 -0.19 0.15 0.740
Other Income 53 0.059* 0.46 -1.88** 2.03** 1.36* 0.089*
Preferred
Dividends 25 0.123 1.13 0.52 0.490
Dividends Paid 71 0.195 -0.93 -0.96 0.14 0.460
Fixed Charges 116 0.959 -0.24 -0.86 0.554
Total Net 
Income 44 0.234 -0.57 0.01 -1.09 0.413
Balance 59 0.291 -0.36 -0.56 0.78 -0.12 0.624
Final Surplus 137 0.114 -0.70 0.21 -1.96** 0.50 0.235
*  10% Significance **  5% Significance ***  1% Significance
T-statistics are adjusted for the finite correction factor.  Raw statistics less than 
0.50 are omitted from the table.
Other income tended to be understated as indicated by the 
digits 4 and 9 being more common and 5 less common than ex-
pected. Both the chi-square statistic for the first digit as a whole 
and the chi-square statistic for frequency of 1 and 5, 4 and 9, 
and other digits were significant. These chi-square results show 
that reported other income fails to follow the pattern of first 
digits expected from Benford’s Law. Combined with the t-test 
result for the numbers 1 (being too few) and 9 (being too fre-
quent), the conclusion can be drawn that regulated companies 
attempted to minimize the affect of other income on total net in-
come. This is consistent with attempting to appear not any more 
profitable than necessary to avoid rate reduction.
The only other significant result in the income statement of reg-
ulated companies was that the digit 4 in final surplus was less com-
16
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mon than expected. This indicates that regulated companies made 
some attempt to make retained income appear larger. However, the 
test for increased frequency of the number 5 was not significant.
Table 4 presents the results of goodness-of-fit tests for the 
balance sheets of regulated companies. The account balances 
tested for these companies were property, plant, and equipment; 
investments; bills receivable; accounts receivable; supplies and 
materials; cash; common stock; preferred stock; bonded debt; 
notes payable; accrued liabilities; bills payable; accounts pay-
able; current liabilities; reserves; surplus; and total assets.
TABLE 4
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Regulated Company Balance Sheets
Distribu-
tion of 1st 
digit t-statistic
Distribution 
of 1 & 5, 4 & 
9, and others
Statement
Line Item N
Chi-square
Probability 1 5 4 9
Chi-square
Probability
Property,
Plant, and 
Equipment 82 0.348 -1.97** 1.33** 0.92 0.043**
Investments 30 0.281 -0.61 -0.59 0.37 0.11 0.385
Bills
Receivable 33 0.207 -0.54 -0.41 0.733
Accounts
Receivable 48 0.864 1.27 -0.29 -0.48 0.275
Supplies and 
Materials 64 0.330 0.88 0.66 -0.72 0.329
Cash 92 0.809 0.64 -0.30 0.56 -0.35 0.833
Common 
Stock 97 0.014** 0.51 2.56*** -1.00 -1.43* 0.041**
Preferred 
Stock 48 0.106 1.59* -0.25 -2.03** 0.90 0.370
Bonded Debt 79 0.071* -0.80 -0.31 1.08 1.55* 0.085*
Notes Payable 27 0.209 -0.26 -0.45 -0.08 -0.68 0.258
Accrued
Liabilities 27 0.360 1.00 -1.17 -0.08 0.886
Bills Payable 28 0.507 0.20 1.78** 0.20 0.066*
Accounts Pay-
able 32 0.783 0.84 0.03 0.358
Current Li-
abilities 30 0.120 0.021 -0.25 -0.76 0.311
Reserves 45 0.272 -1.96** 0.57 0.31 0.150
Surplus 76 0.300 1.16 -1.07 1.60* -0.54 0.399
Total Assets 103 0.069* -2.04** 0.13 1.84** 2.26** 0.004***
*  10% Significance  **   5% Significance  ***  1% Significance
T-statistics are adjusted for the finite correction factor.  Raw statistics less than 
0.50 are omitted from the table.
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Similar to unregulated companies, the digit 4 was more 
common than expected in bills payable. This result was also 
found in the chi-square statistic for the digits 4 and 9. The digit 
9 was also more common than expected in bonded debt. Both 
the chi-square for the entire first digit and the chi-square for 
the 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other digits were significant as well. 
Taken together, these results indicate that regulated companies 
had a tendency to report bills payable and bonded debt as small-
er amounts than would be expected within Benford’s Law.  
For property, plant, and equipment, the digit 1 was less 
common and the digit 4 more common than would be expected 
given Benford’s Law. The common occurrence of these digits in-
dicates a tendency to reduce the size of the property, plant, and 
equipment account balance shown. This result is also confirmed 
in the chi-square statistic for the combined distribution of 1 and 
5 and 4 and 9, which is also significant. This balance-reducing 
behavior may seem opposite the incentive provided by regulated 
rates which would seem to encourage overinvestment in assets. 
This result is also opposite the expected result of changes in ac-
counting policy noted by Bookholdt [1978]. However, companies 
may have been manipulating downward to reduce scrutiny by 
the regulators and appear more efficient by using fewer assets to 
generate the revenue that they actually generated.
The equity accounts show clearer evidence of numeric 
manipulation than in the case of the unregulated companies. 
In common stock, 5 was more common and 9 less common 
than expected.  Both the chi-square for the first digit as a whole 
and the chi-square for the combined distribution of 1 and 5, 4 
and 9, and all other numbers were significant. These results all 
consistently point to a tendency to report larger common stock 
balances than would be expected.  For preferred stock, 1 was 
more common and 4 less common than the expected Benford’s 
Law distribution.  However, for the preferred stock, neither the 
chi-square for the first digit distribution nor the distribution 
for 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other numbers was significant. The 
individual number results again point to balance-increasing 
manipulations. These results indicate that regulated compa-
nies were consistently inflating the capital-stock balances on 
their balance sheets.  For any given amount of income, higher 
equity balances would result in lower return on equity.  This 
result could have given regulated companies some leverage for 
obtaining higher rates to ensure a better return for their capital 
providers. By decreasing bonded debt, which was shown in 
this table as well, the portion of financing provided by equity 
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providers is also maximized. Thus, the managers could inform 
regulators that if adequate return is not given to their sharehold-
ers that the regulated entities will be unable to attract additional 
capital and grow. The companies may have chosen equity as the 
place to manipulate because it was scrutinized to a lesser extent 
than either income or fixed assets. The ICC examined revenues, 
expenses, and earnings [Trebing, 1984] and physical assets are 
clearly visible. However, the balances of capital stock were not 
considered in the legislation or policies for rate regulation and 
would be more difficult for regulators to monitor. Merino [1993] 
points out that watered stock was common in the early 20th 
century. The increasing account-balance manipulations detected 
in this study seem to give empirical weight to this contention.
Reserves showed a lower than expected number for the digit 
1, but this was the only significant result for reserves. The digit 4 
was more common than expected for the surplus balance.  Both 
of these results again indicate a reducing effect on total equity.
Total assets have significantly fewer first digits as number 
1 and significantly more first digits 4 and 9 than would be ex-
pected under Benford’s Law. For total assets, both the chi-square 
for the distribution of first digits and the chi-square for the 
distribution of 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other digits were signifi-
cant. Thus, total assets appear to be manipulated in a downward 
direction. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that rate-
regulated entities would increase their asset base to raise rates. 
However, regulatory scrutiny and pressure may have actually 
encouraged the companies to reduce these numbers. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Table 5 summarizes the results described in the previous 
section along with indicating the hypothesized manipulation. 
A line item was considered for inclusion in this summary table 
when there were two significant results in a consistent direc-
tion in the previous tables. Section A of Table 5 considers the 
unregulated industrial companies. The results found were highly 
consistent with the hypothesis that these companies would ma-
nipulate income and net assets to appear to be a better invest-
ment prospect.  The results indicate that companies tended to 
increase gross revenues leading to increased total net income. 
Moody’s [1915] and other investment services did provide invest-
ment ratings for companies, and these ratings related to income. 
Therefore, manipulating income in an upward direction would 
result in a better investment rating and the ability to attract in-
creased capital at a lower cost.  The income-statement manipu-
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lations found were then consistent with company incentives. 
Likewise on the balance sheet, a safer company is one with 
higher net assets.  The results again supported this hypothesis 
with significant decreases in accounts payable observed.
TABLE 5
Summary of Results
Section A
Unregulated
Companies
Hypotheses Significant Account
Direction of 
Manipulation
Income Statement
Revenues Increasing Gross Revenue Increasing
Expenses Decreasing NA
Totals Increasing Total Net Income Increasing
Balance Sheet
Assets Increasing NA
Liabilities Decreasing Accounts Payable Decreasing
Equity Increasing NA
Section B
Regulated
Companies
Income Statement
Operating Revenues NA NA
Nonoperating
Revenues
Decreasing Other Income Decreasing
Operating Expenses NA NA
Nonoperating
Expenses
Increasing Accrued Taxes Decreasing
Totals Decreasing NA
Balance Sheet
Assets Increasing
Property, Plant, and 
Equipment
Decreasing
Total Assets Decreasing
Liabilities Decreasing Bills Payable Decreasing
Bonded Debt Decreasing
Equity Increasing Common Stock Increasing
Preferred Stock Increasing
Section B of Table 5 summarizes the results for the regu-
lated companies. On the income statement, it was expected that 
only nonoperating items would be manipulated as the regulators 
scrutinized operating revenues and expenses. This expectation 
was confirmed by the results.  Nonoperating revenues were 
manipulated downward to show lower profits. However, accrued 
taxes were actually manipulated in a downward direction which 
increases income. The manipulation of nonoperating revenues 
is logically related to rate setting in the regulated environment. 
However, the manipulation of taxes may have been more mo-
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tivated by manipulations to attract investors. These regulated 
companies do not want to increase income much to reduce rates 
and increase regulation by being too profitable, but showing 
lower payments for taxes may be a way to indicate to investors 
that the company is trying to control costs.
Since rates were often influenced by accounting-rates-of-
return, rate-regulated companies would have an incentive to 
increase net assets to convince regulators that higher rates are 
needed.  The results were consistent with this expectation with 
respect to liability and equity manipulations. However, property, 
plant, and equipment showed a decrease rather than the expect-
ed increase. This result may not be completely inconsistent if 
regulators did examine the operating-asset base as part of their 
evaluations. The reduction of property, plant, and equipment 
would make the company look more efficient with its use of as-
sets and place the company in higher regard with the regulators. 
While neither the depreciation or operating-expenses accounts 
showed signs of manipulation, if the companies were expensing 
assets rather than capitalizing them or recording higher levels 
of depreciation, deliberate decreases in operating assets would 
be associated with lower income which is consistent with the 
rate-increasing goal. The significant decrease in property, plant, 
and equipment, then, could have been accomplished with some 
manipulations to both depreciation and operating expenses so 
that the statistically significant effect in property, plant, and 
equipment was spread between two other accounts, making the 
manipulations to the expense accounts more difficult for Ben-
ford’s Law to detect.    
The manipulations observed with debt and equity accounts 
are highly consistent with achieving the rate-increasing goal. 
The asset base must be financed through either debt or eq-
uity.  By showing lower debt balances, the company indicates to 
regulators a higher reliance on equity financing. This not only 
appears safer but also decreases the return-on-equity measure 
which would lead regulators to a conclusion that higher rates 
are needed for this well run, safe utility or railroad. Thus, these 
manipulations together are highly encouraged by the way regu-
lators set rates.
The results taken as a whole for the rate-regulated compa-
nies indicate that these companies responded to the regulatory 
environment extremely well. No manipulations were found in 
the operating-income accounts which regulators scrutinized. 
The manipulations found, however, are highly consistent with 
actions that could maximize rates given the system used to set 
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rates. Thus, as with manipulations found in current reporting, 
rate-regulated companies were examining incentives set up by 
regulators and manipulated accounts to get the highest return 
for shareholders.
Because of less oversight, the original expectation was that 
more accounts would be manipulated by unregulated entities. 
This ended up not being the case. The regulated companies 
were documented to manipulate eight different line items on 
financial statements while unregulated companies were shown 
to manipulate only three line items. The increased manipulation 
by regulated companies actually may have been encouraged by 
the regulation. The regulated companies were aware of what 
the regulators looked at and how the regulators determined the 
need for rate increases. This knowledge provided companies 
with the information needed to work within the regulations to 
try to increase rates. The unregulated companies lacked regula-
tory scrutiny and were, therefore, able to manipulate any ac-
counts they wanted to achieve goals of higher income and net 
assets. As a result, the unregulated companies may have manip-
ulated different accounts to achieve the higher income/net assets 
appealing to shareholders. Benford’s Law looks at a whole set of 
numbers to find manipulation rather than just the number for 
one company. Therefore, if a few unregulated companies were 
manipulating each account, the technique used in this paper to 
detect the manipulations would not find any distortions in the 
reported data. The accounts found to have significant manipula-
tion were accounts that are high profile in conducting analysis; 
revenues and net income are highly referenced numbers in anal-
ysis.  Thus, the significant manipulation was to accounts that 
investors would likely use to assess the company directly rather 
than to accounts that would accomplish the higher income goal 
less directly. The regulated companies could not manipulate 
these high-profile accounts because they were being scrutinized 
by regulators. Therefore, to accomplish the same goals, the 
regulated companies had to manipulate lower-profile accounts, 
which, because of lower dollar value, may have necessitated 
multiple manipulations. These issues taken together explain the 
relative frequency of accounts being manipulated between the 
regulated and unregulated samples.
The conclusion that regulated companies did not manipu-
late operating revenues and expenses is also important. These 
were the accounts scrutinized by regulators. By failing to find 
manipulation in these accounts for regulated companies but 
finding manipulation of gross revenues and net income by un-
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regulated companies during the same time period, this study 
demonstrates that regulatory scrutiny did seem to influence 
behavior of company officials.
Another limitation of using Benford’s Law to investigate the 
existence of financial-statement manipulations is that it provides 
no evidence of how the manipulations occur.  The amount of the 
likely manipulation is not determined by a Benford’s Law analy-
sis. Analysis using other techniques would be needed to answer 
these questions.
The analysis in this study did show results that are con-
sistent with the assertion that regulated and unregulated com-
panies managed reported results and did so in different ways. 
The only common area of manipulation was current liabilities. 
While unregulated companies manipulated revenue and income, 
regulated companies were more likely to manipulate amounts 
in non-value maximizing ways and did so in accounts that were 
more difficult to verify. This suggests that the regulatory process 
provided some scrutiny of results and did influence the types of 
manipulations made. Examining the pre-SEC, pre-audit, pre-
promulgated accounting standards era indicates that incentives 
did exist for manipulation and that financial-statement manipu-
lation did exist consistent with those incentives. Therefore, the 
results indicate that to reduce financial-statement manipulation 
in the past as well as today, either incentives for manipulation 
need to be reduced and/or greater oversight with respect to what 
is reported is needed. This confirms the importance of examin-
ing the incentives implicit in both private contracts and public 
regulations.  
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